Democracies Under Threat

On August 2nd, a plane carrying Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the United States’ House of Representatives, touched down in Taiwan (more formally known as the Republic of China). Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan comes amid the backdrop of deteriorating relations between mainland China (more formally known as the People’s Republic of China) and the United States. The visit itself was seen as provocative by mainland China, which regards Taiwan as rightfully belonging to the mainland for historical and strategic reasons, and sees this as potentially opening the door to American recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign entity separate from China. Such a recognition would be in breach of the current formulation of American-Chinese ties, which was built on a One China policy, where the United States acknowledged that “ that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.” This policy and its (somewhat ambiguous) wording was first established by the 1972 Shanghai Communique and was reinforced by subsequent agreements. China reacted to this visit by holding military exercises near Taiwan and severing various agreements with the United States.

The Biden administration for its part downplayed the significance of the visit to Taiwan by Pelosi and insisted that nothing has changed regarding US policy toward Taiwan. However, Biden himself had previously and repeatedly stated that the United States would militarily defend Taiwan if mainland China invaded. His administration sought to walk back from such pronouncements each time. This back and forth between China and the Biden administration has led The Global Times, a Chinese newspaper with strong ties to the ruling Communist party, to proclaim that “ China’s deeds match its words, while the US [Biden in particular] says one thing but does another.” In effect, they are complaining that at best Biden is not in charge of his own administration or that Biden lies about his intentions.

The only binding commitment that the United States has undertaken to Taiwan, which does have some strategic value for the United States, is governed by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. This act did not create a defensive alliance with Taiwan where the US was obligated to go to war for the survival of Taiwan but only guaranteed that the US would provide Taiwan with defensive weaponry. Nevertheless, previously when China threatened to use military force to alter the status quo regarding Taiwan, the United States has deployed various military assets to deter such a move. While previously the United States, due to its immense military and technological superiority, could get away with a show of force against China’s saber rattling toward Taiwan. The balance of power between China and the US has changed significantly, since the 1996 Third Taiwan Straits Crisis and the 1997 Taiwan visit by the-then Speaker of the House. This article will discuss some of those military changes between the United States and China and how Taiwan can strengthen its chances of survival.

Given the current military balance between China and the United States, can the United States military prevent the forceable takeover of Taiwan by China or if Taiwan is already taken can the United States easily regain that militarily? When China and the United States faced off against each other in the Korean War, the quantity of Chinese forces proved to be more than enough to repel the American advances into North Korea and establish a stalemate. In the 1990s, the Chinese military, despite being still vast in numbers, was in a poor state. In 1999 only about 20 percent of its ground forces were even equipped to be able to move about their own country. The military also suffered from corruption, poor morale, old equipment, and had limited professionalism and capabilities. In effect, it was, when compared to a country like the United States, at a great qualitative disadvantage. While China has not fully caught up with the United States, it has progressed much since the 1990s. Michele Flournoy, an undersecretary of defense policy under Obama, affirmed that much has changed since the 1990s and noted that compared to then the United States would operate in “a much more contested and much more lethal environment.”

The Chinese military is modernizing and already possesses greater quantities of warships and air defense systems than the United States. The Chinese military is estimated by one top defense official at the Pentagon to acquire new weapons at a pace that is five to six times faster than the United States. As American naval strategy still rests upon its carriers, some argue that technological advances may be making such carriers fleets limited in their effectiveness if not outmoded. The development of Chinese carrier killing missiles, which now have a range of 1,500 nautical miles, have spurred such concern and debate. The Chinese have also developed hypersonic missile technology to which the United States has no effective defense against so far. As of the writing of this article, the United States has also been unable to successfully produce its own hypersonic missiles. While the US still has a general technological edge on China, this edge is narrowing compared to what it was in the 1990s. This present but eroding edge has worrying implications for America’s ability to defend Taiwan militarily.

In terms of logistics, it is also more difficult for the US to defend Taiwan than it is for China to assault it. After all, China has a greater concentration of forces in the region than the United States whose military assets are diffused across the globe and China has the advantage of a much shorter supply line across what realists refer to as “the stopping power of water”. An analysis by the RAND Corporation notes that military invasion is not the only option for China to change the status quo over Taiwan and an imposed naval quarantine on Taiwan by China could also accomplish such a goal and that “a counterblockade by the United States…is unlikely to be successful.” This is not to write that the United States can do nothing against China on a number of these points or that a limited conventional war is inevitably doomed to lead to an American defeat. Indeed, there is some commentary on things that the United States could do to deter China from taking Taiwan, including measures ranging from putting military assets on the ground in Taiwan to other alternatives that are being flouted around. I will note that there must be recognition that China has managed to translate its economic gains into a much more formidable military power wherein seeking an active shooting war with China, especially when we are merely obligated to supply Taiwan with defensive arms, would not be wise. In effect, such a direct military undertaking by the United States promises to be costly and is far from certain to succeed.

What strategy then could be taken to improve Taiwan’s chances at continued political survival within the perimeters allowed by past agreements between the United States and China? The United States ought to make it plain that Taiwan must repair the lackluster state of affairs within its military and ensure that Taiwan has the means to defend itself. While Taiwan enjoys defensive advantages like their mountainous islands, urban density, and a popular sentiment of resistance that promise to make a mainland Chinese invasion materially costly, it must also have a strong defense force capable of being a powerful deterrent in its own right. To do so Taiwan must dramatically improve the quality of its military training as well as extending the period of conscription beyond 4 months. It must do so in the model of an Israel or Singapore in having a good quality conscript army. Taiwan already possesses a native defense industry which should further aid Taiwan’s quest to produce suitable weaponry and ensure that the military is adequately provisioned. Diplomatic means should also be employed with equivalent if not greater zeal to assuage mainland China. The gist of such diplomatic talks must be that the United States and Taiwan are committed to what they have previously agreed to with the mainland and that the United States will not recognize Taiwan as an independent state since it only recognizes one state as China and that Taiwan agrees to never formally proclaim itself independent. China in turn would repledge itself to forswear a militarily achieved reunification with Taiwan and to respect the status quo. Such a maneuver if successful would also assuage the Taiwanese public who do not by and large want a declaration of independence from China and are broadly comfortable with the status quo. This strategy thus promises to be broadly supported by Taiwanese public opinion while being acceptable to mainland China.

Everyone is aware and most likely has felt the impact of inflation in recent years. In the US and the EU, at the time of writing, the annual inflation rates are respectively 8.26% and 10.1%. To put this into perspective, the long-term average inflation rates are respectively 3.26% and 1.95%. For many people, high inflation is causing significant issues in their day-to-day life. The average American household for example will already spend over $8,600 more this year, assuming no further increase in inflation. Some families across the US and the EU are struggling to make ends meet during these difficult times. In fact, a staggering 78% of registered American voters report inflation has caused financial hardship in their own lives.

In order to curb inflation, leaders are making historic decisions. At the end of July, the European Central Bank (ECB) increased interest rates by 50 basis points (a basis point is 1/100th of 1%) to 0%, which is the first rate hike in 11 years. Meaning that the increase was higher than expected, which ECB president Christine Lagarde justified by saying: “Inflation continues to be undesirably high and is expected to remain above our target for some time. The latest data indicate a slowdown in growth, clouding the outlook for the second half of 2022 and beyond.” This slowdown in growth is a dangerous trend as it will likely lead the ECB to face a severe stagflationary shock, which would be beyond its control. Another recent historic decision was this month's Inflation Reduction Act signed by US President Joe Biden. The recently passed bill was worth $430 billion, which will be used to try and lower the cost of healthcare, prescription drugs and energy.

Given the fact that inflation has created major financial anxieties across the population, it may be tempting to offer a quick-fix solution such as price fixing. However, these kinds of solutions may have catastrophic results for the economy. Take for example Venezuela, where price controls completely destroyed the market mechanisms of the economy, leading to massive shortages and a humanitarian crisis. As well as in the US in the 70s, when President Nixon imposed a 90-day freeze on wages and pricing. This was a political success for Nixon but a disaster for the economy (known as the Nixon shock), as it brought on a recession, stagflation and instability in currency markets. So we have to be extremely careful in our response to inflation.

To better grasp the situation, we are going to explore the differences between US and EU inflation, because even though they may be at a similar level, they are not as alike as you may think. First of all, let’s clarify the difference between the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the core inflation rate. The CPI determines the country’s inflation rate by monitoring the prices of a fixed basket of goods and services purchased by households. This is the inflation rate I have been referring to so far. The core inflation rate is determined by removing short-run volatile components of the CPI and therefore represents the long-run trend in the price level. The effects of events that cause abnormal fluctuations in markets (mainly food and energy) are not well represented in the core inflation rate. For example, the covid crisis, the global shipping crisis and the war in Ukraine.

In the EU, the difference between the CPI and core inflation rate is quite big, they are respectively 10.1% and 4.3%. This indicates that a large part of the current spike in inflation is a result of short-run volatility in key sectors, largely influenced by the sanctions put on Russia. Now, when we look at the US, the difference between CPI and core inflation is rather small. They are respectively 8.26% and 6.32% indicating that short-run volatility is not a big reason for the spike in inflation in the US. So whereas in the EU the inflation is mostly a result of volatility due to short-term events, in the US there are deeper rooted long-term problems causing inflation. We can also see this difference in the financial markets. For example, natural gas prices are about three times as high in Europe as in the US following the war in Ukraine. The data suggest that the magnitude of the fiscal and monetary policy of the US government has been systematically driving up prices. During the previous and current American administrations, there has been a massive stimulus to the US economy. Take a look at Biden’s $2.5 trillion stimulus program and Trump’s $900 billion programs at the end of his tenure. These programs, which together make up 15% of the GDP, have overheated the economy by pushing it beyond productive capacity. These programs may produce concentrated gains, but they also cause long-term consequences, which are now seen in the US economy.

Furthermore, a part of the core inflation in the EU is actually a result of the US stimulus bills. Since 2020, due to these stimulus bills, Americans have spent an additional $600 billion on goods. This combined with the ongoing global supply chain crisis led to an increase in prices worldwide. In the meantime, Europe’s demand fell below its pre-pandemic levels. As a result of the US stimulus bills, Europe is therefore absorbing a part of the inflation produced by the US, while the US takes advantage of the short-term purchasing power benefits. This dynamic is also visible when comparing economic indicators like nominal wages and GDP. Nominal wages in the US have grown by 6% last year, as opposed to 3.8% in the EU. And while Europe’s nominal GDP is 1.4% below pre-pandemic levels, the US is up by 4%.

Looking at the inflation rate from a different angle, therefore, helps us conclude that the sudden increase in inflation in the EU and the US have some similar origins but also some very different ones. The impact of recent events is not the main reason for US inflation, but it is for the EU, which is more dependent on Russian resources. On top of that, the EU’s inflation is being influenced by the US monetary policy, as noted in the last paragraph. Both the US and the EU have introduced extra money into the economy over the last few years, which is a common cause of inflation. However, comparing the CPI and core inflation has shown us that in the US, its own monetary policy is a much bigger factor in inflation than in the EU. This is an important insight when it comes to solving the problem and combating inflation. Especially when less than a year ago, US President Joe Biden, Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen, and other notable US government officials disregarded price increases as temporary. But as we have concluded in this article, inflation in the US is everything but transitory. Just this week on September 19th, President Joe Biden downplayed the severity of the inflation by noting it has been relatively constant for a few months. However, this doesn't change the fact that it's the highest rate in 40 years. Biden’s plan to avoid a recession is to “continue to grow the economy”. But whether he realises it’s the fiscal and monetary policy of the US government that has been systematically driving up prices and overheating the economy remains a mystery to me.

On September 22nd during a speech in front of the UN, Yair Lapid stated his belief that, “An agreement with the Palestinians, based on two states for two peoples, is the right thing for Israel’s security”. Lapid’s speech and very public support for the two-state solution did not mention Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority (PA) by name. Instead, he shared a condition shared by the vast majority of Israelis for a future Palestinian state, that the state created "be a peaceful one". In response to Lapid’s speech, Abbas responded by arguing that Israel’s “premeditated and deliberate policies” were “destroying the two-state solution”. Abbas went even further, claiming that this was why the Palestinians “no longer have an Israeli partner to whom we can talk”. Abbas’s delusional response to Lapid’s UN speech was filled with historical revisionism and a general failure to take responsibility for his own missed opportunities for peace during his years as President of the PA, an office he has occupied for over 17 years. Abbas’s gaslighting rejection of Lapid’s speech provides even further evidence that Abbas has never been a suitable or plausible partner for peace.

At a recent conference in Berlin in August of this year, Abbas was asked if he was going to apologize on the 50th anniversary of the 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre. He responded by saying in Arabic, "From 1947 to the present day, Israel has committed 50 massacres in Palestinian villages and cities, 50 massacres, 50 holocausts and until today and every day, there are casualties killed by the Israeli military". When Abbas said that Israel had committed 50 holocausts, it is disrespectful both because of its historical inaccuracy and because it minimizes the uniquely terrible event that the Jewish nation went through. Jews were murdered in the Holocaust, through systematic and incomprehensibly brutal methods and a person with a basic level of knowledge and reason, will understand that this is a very different dynamic from the Arab-Israeli conflict. The timing and location of Abbas's rant also added to the speech's chutzpah. His rant in the Chancellerly, a historic German government building where the Bundestag (German parliament) sits, on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the 1972 Munich Massacre (when Palestinian terrorists attacked and massacred an Israeli Olympic team) antagonized the German Chancellor Olaf Scholtz, who later said he was “disgusted” with Abbas’s remarks.

Unfortunately, this sickening remark is not the first time this type of insane historical revisionism and anti-Semitic rhetoric has been spouted by Palestinaian leaders and their followers. Abbas's response to UN speech only served to further highlight the discrepancy between the world's desire for a Palestinian partner and the reality on the ground. Regardless, the West continues to support the PA and Abbas due to the simple and sad fact that Abbas may be the most least terrible, most moderate Palestinian leader, relative to other Palestinian leaders. This may be part of the reason why the West still pays "lip service" to the idea of Abbas as a partner for peace, ignoring the long history of evidence to the contrary. After all, Palestinians in the West Bank have little love for Abbas, with a recent June 2022 poll finding that 72% of West Bank Palestinians believed Abbas should resign. The poll also found that if elections were held today, only 49% of respondents (from the West Bank) said they would vote and Abbas would lose to Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh by a wide margin (55% for Haniyeh-33% for Abbas).

This recent poll is one of the many that reveal that the vast majority of the Palestinian public are frustrated with Abbas’s leadership and would like to see him step down from power. Abbas is very afraid (justifiably so) of the very strong likelihood that he would lose an election if it was held today in the West Bank. It also shows why elections for the Palestinian Parliment have not been held in the West Bank since 2006 and yet the West has supported him, despite his undemocratic policies. For all of Abbas’s faults, his desire to remain in power provides a force of political consistency in the West Bank for the West and Israel to rely on. If elections were held today, he would likely be replaced by a Palestinian leader with a more violent modus operandi for dealing with Israel, such as Marwan Barghouti, currently in prison for his involvement in a number of violent attacks on Israelis, or the veteran Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh. Thus, any deal struck with Abbas, whose public support is shaky at best, is a dangerous gamble for Israel that it can’t afford to take, because Israel would understandably have extremely serious concerns about Abbas’s ability to implement the deal's commitments on the Palestinian side. For now, the West Bank and Israel tolerate the 85 year old Abbas as the best of a bad situation, in an effort to prevent an even further deterioration of the security situation in the West Bank. Abbas’s continued grip on power also means that the two-state solution is likely to remain in a sort of purgatory until new Palestinian leadership is found that has the political will and capital to enter into an agreement with Israel.

Only 45 days after becoming the prime minister of the United Kingdom, Liz Truss announced her resignation stating “I recognize I cannot deliver the mandate on which I was elected by Conservative party”. The announcement of her resignation marked the end of Liz Truss’s time as prime minister and gave her the infamous distinction of governing for the smallest duration in the history of Great Britain. Her announcement was a dramatic U-turn from the day before in which she pushed back against demands for her resignation, saying defiantly “I’m a fighter not a quitter”. The speed of her downfall demands a question: how did it all go so wrong, so quickly for Liz Truss?

Truss, the former foreign minister under her predecessor, Boris Johnson, tried to profile herself as a new Margaret Thatcher, with plans for radical reforms intended to cut taxes. Rishi Sunak meanwhile warned about this plan, but his service as Chancellor of the Exchequer (finance minister) made him an unpopular candidate in the eyes of party members. Truss was more popular in their eyes, and this ultimately decided the vote in her favour, even if many members of the Parliament (MPs) disliked her and voted for Sunak in the last round. Unfortunately for her, the general public was not convinced of her abilities.

From the start of her mandate, things seemed to go downhill with every passing moment. Just two days from her election, the reign of Elisabeth II ended by her sudden death, which left the nation in mourning for ten days. After the resumption of normality in political life, her Chancellor of the Exchequer Kwasi Kwarteng delivered the so-called “Mini budget”. The “Mini budget” proposed tax cuts, some expected and some not, made to relieve the economy. However, the expected cost of the plan, which was estimated to cost the treasury 45 billion Pounds, was not addressed by Truss and her cabinet. She even refused to publish the analysis of the budget while stating that no cuts in spending will be made. This refusal to clarify the budget provoked a reaction on the markets and plunged the Pound to a very low position relative to the Dollar. Borrowing costs for the UK also spiked. This pushed the Bank of England to react and prevent further damage.

Irreversible damage was unfortunately done, and cracks started to widen. Liz Truss’s popularity fell in the polls along with the Conservative party. Simultaneously, Labour’s polling was rising. The upcoming Conservative party conference also did not help her. Some MPs openly criticised her tax plan. This provoked her reaction and she decided to revert on the issue of top tax rate, which she planned to lower from 45% to 40%. Her reputation and authority, already weak, only got worse.

Truss stood firm on her plan not to cut public spending, but it proved futile as the markets reacted negatively again. She then decided to sack Kwarteng and replace him with Jeremy Hunt. Hunt stated that a reversal of the “Mini budget” was made, which included removal of most planned tax cuts and only limited cuts in other areas. Along with this, he proposed a scale back on the support of energy bills. Although the markets calmed, this directly went against what Truss said earlier and rocked the confidence in her even more. It was also seen as a sign of the intention to remove her from office. Polls proved to be even more catastrophic for her, as she was perceived to be the worst prime minister of the United Kingdom since polling began.

Then came a fatal blow for her on Wednesday 20th of October. This is how it went in a chronological order. Truss stood firm on her plan in stark contrast to Hunt’s previous statement regarding the reduction in scale of the “mini budget”, and also sacked her home secretary Suella Braverman over a disagreement. In the House of Commons, the Labour party proposed a vote on fracking. Unlike many members of the Conservatives, Truss is not against fracking. After some statements of Conservative MPs not to block the vote put forward by Labour because of their unfavourable opinion on fracking, Truss decided to frame the vote as a confidence issue. This move would imply that if any MPs from the Conservative party did not vote with the government their whip would be removed. This removal would essentially mean they would not be part of the party anymore. But, if enough of the members did not cast their vote as the government, then the government would lose confidence and a new one would have to take its place.

An ensuing chaos erupted and seeing that she did not have the power to remove any dissident MPs, Truss backed down. But the final outcome was a revolt by over thirty members of the party who abstained from voting on the issue. Alongside this, alleged misconduct against some conservative MPs will be investigated. After the vote, Truss reversed the decision on the confidence vote and the MPs who did not vote in accordance with the government would face consequences. Unfortunately for her, Truss again realised that her power was not enough to kick out thirty members, among whom are Boris Johnson and Theresa May, both former prime ministers. She backed down once more.

The next morning would see her downfall as annoyed members of the party started giving in letters of no confidence en masse to a specialised committee, called the 1922 committee. Sir Graham Brady, the leader of this committee, put these letters in front of Truss and told her to resign her post around noon. At 1:30 PM GMT in a televised address speaking outside 10 Downing Street, Truss announced her resignation. A new leadership election is to take place in the upcoming week.

This leaves the United Kingdom without a government in time of great economic upheaval. The Conservative party is left to find a new prime minister to tackle the issues. This will not be an easy task as the leadership of the party will be put in the hands of a fifth leader in a period of just six years. Given the fact that the Conservatives have a governing majority and thus any elections are unlikely to occur, the candidate selected by the Conservatives to be prime minister will also face aspirations on the legitimacy of his/her mandate to govern. It remains to see if the successor will improve the situation or continue the downfall of both the party and the UK, which remains in a state of crisis hit hard first by the COVID-19 crisis and now the energy crisis. This instability has pushed many citizens to the brink and made them demand change, either in the government conduct or in elections. Truss’s successor will face an uphill battle to push through his/her proposed agenda effectively and will need to gain momentum early on. After all, Truss’s short stint as prime minister shows just how quickly political support can evaporate with an ineffective start.

Two months after the onset of the Ukrainian counter offensive at the beginning of September the stance of the conflict has changed dramatically. Ukrainian forces have liberated more than 10,000 square kilometers, the Russian Duma ratified the supposed “annexation” of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions despite lacking full control of any of the regions and a tenuous grasp on the only regional capital Russian forces acquired in the entirety of their campaign. Putin decreed martial law and the mobilization of 300,000 men, an order whose execution has been plagued with violations of the established protections for students, and stories involving agents of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) raiding cafes and business districts to grab men at random. A defected Russian diplomat has provided an unprecedented glimpse at the inner thoughts of the Russian Foreign Ministry at a personnel level and exposed the extent to which post-2014 sanctions crippled the logistical infrastructure of the Russian military.

To make up for these shortcomings, the organs of Russian state propaganda are setting information conditions for an unprecedented false-flag attack on the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant up river in Kherson. While the Russian sources claimed that they had intelligence the Ukrainians were going to sabotage the dam (which is currently under Russian control), the Ukrainians have negligible incentives to destroy such a piece of critical infrastructure that supplies water and electricity to millions of people in southern Ukraine and provides the water crucial to cooling the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (also under Russian occupation). Moreover, the ensuing flood would catastrophically threaten 80 towns and cities downstream (including Kherson where there is mixed evidence of a coming withdrawal). Meanwhile, Moscow has every reason to blow the dam - from escalating the asymmetric warfare against the civilian population of Ukraine, crippling key energy infrastructure, reinforcing domestic propaganda that Ukraine is a "terrorist state", and covering any future retreat from Kherson by swamping towns and making the Dnipro river and surrounding terrain temporarily unpassable.

On the home front, Putin has implemented a "partial mobilization" and martial law (to varying degrees, with the highest levels being in the four recently claimed regions of Ukraine), which are likely meant as a twofold measure to improve the faltering state of Russia's front lines and throttle the levers of repression to stifle growing dissent. At the current moment, Putin is caught between a rock and a hard place - he cannot appease any of the main blocs in Russian politics. The militantly nationalist Siloviki group within the government that makes up his primary support will not be satisfied with anything but the promised victory. The oligarchs are losing vast sums of money as long as the conflict ensues. The masses are receiving news of defeats they were not pre-conditioned to hear and mounting losses for unobservable gains and stories of students and other citizens protected from mobilization being drafted undermines the trust between the public and the Kremlin. Critics argue that the decree is mostly legal theater designed to legitimize activities the Russian military needs to or is already undertaking while simultaneously creating a legal structure for mobilization and domestic restrictions down the line.

However, untrained conscripts thrown into the meatgrinder will only staunch the bleeding for a short time, but will do nothing to solve the major shortcomings shown by the Russian military in Ukraine, including disunity within the Russian military command structure, worsening equipment and component shortages, poor morale, and the inability of inconvenient but honest assessments to reach upper leadership. This has been on display throughout Ukraine's September counter offensives on multiple axes, during which Russian forces repeatedly squandered what little available resources they had on inconsequential assaults in the area around Donetsk rather than bolstering their Northern defenses - which resulted in a full rout on the northern axis after the loss of Izium. These orders were crafted in a reality far different from our own - one constrained by an administrative culture of sycophantic survivalism, fatalistic imperialism, and a bureaucracy that has for the most part drunk its own Kool-aid. A reality that has no place for pesky problems such as low morale, supply chain issues, degraded equipment, manpower problems, and training deficiencies.

The Institute for the Study of War assessed that Russian moves closer to full-scale martial law and national mobilization are unsurprising but disordered. A competent modern military should implement economic mobilization, secure lines of transportation, and coordinate territorial defense before or as initial mobilization for war begins, not as follow-on reserve mobilization nears its completion. Some of this may be explained by an observation made by the former Kremlin speechwriter turned political consultant, Abbas Gallyamov, who said the decision to declare martial law in occupied Ukraine and impose other restrictions inside Russia appeared more focused on suppressing internal dissent than improving its flailing war effort. Indeed, hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens have fled the country in the weeks since the Sept. 21st mobilization order.

In the light of these obstacles, Russia is trying to achieve asymmetrical gains through the use of Shahed 136 drones and other long range weapons such as Kalibr cruise missiles to strike residential areas and critical energy infrastructure. While the targeting of civilians is unlikely to yield the kind of war weariness the Kremlin is hoping for, the strikes on energy infrastructure have been incredibly expensive, but somewhat effective. President Zelenskyy claimed that recent Russian strikes have damaged 30% of Ukrainian power plants, causing blackouts for over a million people. Each cruise missile cost on the order of $1-15 million depending on the type used and the Ukrainians have had a recent interception rate in excess of 50%, which (along with dwindling stockpiles of precision munitions) likely explains the adoption of Shahed-136 drones for their significantly cheaper price tag of $20-30,000 despite the Russians reported inability to operate them effectively. Additionally, a spokesperson for the Ukrainian Air Force Command claimed that their forces have downed more than 273 Shahed-136 drones since Russia began using them in September

These overall changes are the context in which the Kherson dilemma faces the Kremlin. The creation of the so-called “Wagner Line” (a defensive barrier being erected by elements of the pseudo-mercenary Wagner Group) far back from the current front lines, along with the transportation of men, ammo, and civilian hostages across the Dnipro river indicate that the Russian field command is expecting to cede significant portions of land in the coming months. Notably, the Russian state news agencies, and numerous Russian military bloggers (Kremlin backed online pro-war pundits) are setting conditions in the informational space for a complete withdrawal of western Kherson. Russian military bloggers have posted that “[our] forces ‘will receive bad news from Kherson Oblast’ in the coming week and that “November will be very, very hard". Moreover in an interview on Russian state-controlled television a war correspondent claimed that Ukrainian forces outnumber Russians by four to one in kherson and that "there will be no good news in the next two months, that’s for sure … severe territorial losses are likely in these two months, but defeat in one battle does not mean losing the war.”

For Russian authorities the catch 22 of Kherson boils down to the fact that Russian forces on the western bank cannot hold the city without risking encirclement and annihilation, yet giving up the largest city that Moscow proclaimed as part of annexed territory of the Russian Federation just weeks ago (which is thus theoretically protected under its nuclear umbrella) would set a precedent that dramatically undermines the legitimacy of any future nuclear saber rattling, and increases the geopolitical costs of using a nuclear strike of any kind to stifle the prolonged multifront advances of the Ukrainian forces. Moreover, it delegitimizes the fundamental grounds of the already illegal Russian annexation if it cannot even hold its supposed “borders”.

The loss of Kherson would be the single largest strategic defeat of the war, and the impact on the already tumultuous Russian information space would be near untenable for the narrative of limited setbacks adopted by the Kremlin. However, an uncompromising defense of the city could easily result in the same kind of Russian rout that occurred around Kharkov in mid September - an outcome that would be even more disastrous for the overall war effort. No matter what happens in the battle for Kherson, the Russians are bound to be dealt a poor hand.