Mounting Tensions

The Abraham Accords, which are the series of agreements by various Sunni Islamic states to sign normalization deals with the State of Israel, were a major diplomatic breakthrough in the annals of the Arab Israeli conflict. The Accords did not touch upon the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, nor do they mean the end of regional violence and instability but it does signal a regional shift of the main Arab focus of struggle away from Israel. As of January 13, 2022, Israel is still reportedly engaged in behind the scenes talks to expand the number of states that recognize the Jewish state. This sea change in Middle Eastern politics was not accomplished through the Oslo peace process, which was supposed to usher in a “New Middle East” as was envisioned by the late former Israeli foreign minister (as well as prime minister and president) Shimon Peres of regional stability, prosperity, and integration through resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict first. Instead, this breakthrough was achieved as a consequence of Arab regional power rivalry with Iran and to a lesser degree with Turkey. Indeed, since the Arab Spring, Israel has not been seen as the reflexive principal peril to the Arabs by the Arab public in some states as nations like Iran have come under increasing scrutiny. In Israel itself a domestic sea change has followed the foreign one. The current government of Israel is also the first government to include an independent Arab party (the United Arab List/Ra’am) in its coalition. The matter of how this dynamic of an Arab coalition partner sees itself in the political system of the Jewish state and how this works (or does not work) with the government is the subject matter of this article.

Mansour Abbas, the head of the Islamist United Arab List party, made an astonishing statement at a Globes conference in December on how he views the relationship between his party’s agenda and the State of Israel in general. He stated that, “Israel was born as a Jewish state. And that was the decision of the Jewish people, to establish a Jewish state. The question is not ‘what is the identity of the state?’ That’s how the state was born, and so it will remain… This is the reality. The question is not about the state’s identity — but what the status of Arab citizens will be in it.” He has also echoed these sentiments in Arabic. This exact statement is not the full-on recognition of the legitimacy of the Jewish state and of the Jew’s claim to the land of Israel that persons like Dr. Mordechai Kedar opine that Abbas should make. It is, however, an improvement over the old rejectionist line of trying to fundamentally erase the structural nature of the Jewish state like attempting to remove or revise the national anthem, which is about the 2,000 year old yearning of Jews for national independence. In other words, while Abbas, who ran on providing policing and infrastructure to Arab communities, may not embrace that identity of the state he lives in, he acknowledges that it is what it is and does not seek to change things in that respect. Noting this, Mansour’s comments have been meet by consternation and condemnation by a former chairman of his own party, by members of the Joint List, which is the other Arab majority party in the Israeli parliament, by Hamas, and even by the president of the Palestinian Authority himself.

Abbas has accomplished much in his time in government with respect to his promises. To alleviate the high crime rate in Arab communities, the government has agreed to a five-year plan that will cost $9.4 billion to improve socio-economic conditions there as well as fund a separate $780 million program that will seek to directly address the current crime wave in these areas. Abbas has also secured the passage of a controversial Electricity Law, which directs the state to connect homes that were illegally built by Israeli Bedouins in the Negev (Israel’s southern desert) to the nation’s water and electricity grids. The law in question has its critics who ponder the vagueness of how many people are to be covered under this new law as well as the unequal application of the law to the Bedouin while not extending the same rights to those Jews whom the Israeli government deems to have illegally build homes in the West Bank (also known as Judea and Samaria).

There are, however, limitations to this newfound spirit of cooperation that Abbas has struck with the government as it relates to his own community’s relationship to the state. The United Arab List has threatened to leave the government (and thus collapse the government) in reaction to the recent January protests and riots by the Bedouin, who are a key component of the party’s voters, in the Negev over afforestation projects by the Jewish National Fund. The Jewish National Fund is a quasi-governmental body tasked with land reclamation, afforestation, and general assistance to Jewish settlement. The chief controversy of the dispute revolves around whether the territory in question that the Jewish National Fund is working on is state property (which the Fund claims) or private Bedouin property (which the protestors claim). This question over the demarcation of property between the Bedouins, who traditionally led a nomadic lifestyle that has made establishing fixed and well documented private property for them difficult, and the state is a long-standing issue in Israel. In fact, this is an issue that long predates the Jewish State, and it is an issue that has relevance not only in Israel but in the wider Arab world of how to settle or deal with the Bedouin (and other groups). An announcement was made on January 12th that a compromise was reached where the current afforestation project would be stopped and that the government would try to craft a new afforestation plan.

Nevertheless, this compromise in addition to the aforementioned law on providing electricity to illegal Bedouin communities in the Negev have led to detractors of the new government arguing that such concessions may only further diminish the rule of law in these places by encouraging the Bedouin to increase their illegal building activity in the Negev and effectively block the capacity of the state to assert its own sovereignty in these communities. Indeed, one general in the army reserves commented that if the rule of law continues to deteriorate then “we [Israel] will lose the Negev in another year or two.” The matter of whether the United Arab List can be an effective bridge between the Arab community and Israel by forging a new and lasting consensus on how to resolve issues that touch on various strong political sensibilities is still to be determined. It is even questionable whether the United Arab List can make such lasting contributions by remaining in the current government, which if the polls are to be believed is unpopular and is seen to be losing seats if elections were held now.

That Mansour Abbas would choose to instead partner with Netanyahu (or his successor in the Likud party), whom the country by a plurality sees as a more preferential option than the current coalition, should not be seen as a totally absurd idea. For one thing, Abbas’s party has been shown by recent events to be pragmatic with whom they ally with as they did end up partnering with Yamina, a right-wing pro-settler party, and a number of other right-wing parties to form the current government. For another, Netanyahu has shown himself to be amenable on certain issues that concern the Arab community like on economic development and fighting crime. It was after all under Netanyahu that a $3.84 billion five-year plan was approved to develop minority communities and $32 million was pledged to fight general violence and organized crime in Arab communities. Indeed, in the last election Netanyahu tried to court the Arab vote and tried to get Abbas on board with forming a coalition with him. A more ideologically compact coalition with the right and the religious given the current political climate in Israel might ultimately be more sustainable with the public at large.

Whether Abbas does jump ship or not, the mode of Israeli politics like the mode of Middle East politics through the Abraham Accords and the spirit of practical normalization it has engendered has been altered. With regard to Israeli politics, it has been changed with an independent Arab party joining a government on a pragmatic basis. While Abbas has demonstrated that tangible things can be gained for the Arab community by being a part of the government, there are questions about how long the governent can last and about how to address the particular problems that beset the Arab community without creating a disconnect between the government and the public. For instance, if such riotous behavior continues and increases among the Bedouin after such concessions by the government then the public at large is likely to become more dismissive of the demands by this community. The public may also question the government over the substance of what the government agreed to like over the unequal application of law under the Electricity Law. Furthermore, if the proposed solutions to these demands by the government, which is composed of a multiplicity of ideologies, veers too leftward then this will alienate the segment of the population that might vote for the more right-wing elements of the government and vice versa. In any case, the question of how to better integrate the traditional state interests with Arab demands while not alienating the mostly Jewish populace is an open one. Providing that Abbas keeps these demands pragmatic then this integration has a greater chance of success.

“The mission of China's space program is: to explore outer space to expand humanity's understanding of the earth and the cosmos; to facilitate global consensus on our shared responsibility in utilizing outer space for peaceful purposes and safeguarding its security for the benefit of all humanity; to meet the demands of economic, scientific and technological development, national security and social progress; and to raise the scientific and cultural levels of the Chinese people, protect China's national rights and interests, and build up its overall strength.” - Mission statement of the 2021 White Paper

“Principles: China's space industry is subject to and serves the overall national strategy. China adheres to the principles of innovation-driven, coordinated, efficient, and peaceful progress based on cooperation and sharing to ensure a high-quality space industry.” - Principles statement of the 2021 White Paper

With the recent publication of China’s 5-year White Paper on Space Activities, it is worth taking a closer look at the policies, rhetoric, and actions of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) space program as a whole - and more specifically, the blatant omission of any security dimensions regarding orbital activities. Before discussing the contents and limitations of the White Paper, a few aspects of the Chinese space sector should be clarified. Although the Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA, a Chinese analogue to NASA) largely follows the ideals in the document’s preamble: that “China upholds the principle of exploration and utilization of outer space for peaceful purposes”, the other primary actors in their national space program do not.

The two actors in question are the China Manned Space Agency (which deals with all crewed missions) and the Strategic Support force (which was established as its own branch of the military in 2015 to coordinate all space and cyberwarfare operations), both of which fall into the command structure of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Pointedly, the White Paper never mentions the CNSA as the focus of the document (or at all), and presumably is meant to examine the breadth of Chinese space activities. We can reasonably make this assumption due to the mention of both manned operations in the construction of the Tiangong space station and the historical development of missile technology, both of which fall outside the scope of the CNSA.

It is with this assumption in mind that the first concerning omissions become apparent. Despite acknowledging in the White Paper, that part of “[t]he mission of China's space program is… to meet the demands… of national security and social progress” in order to “protect China’s national rights and interests, and build up its overall strength”, the publication is largely quiet on recent activities related to these issues. To name a few developments with significant security implications conveniently forgotten by the State Council Information Office of the PRC:

(1) Although the 2016 launch of the Micius quantum encrypted satellite and a number of its experiments were mentioned, the implications of “entanglement-based secure quantum cryptography” for establishing undecryptable and non-interceptable communications networks are overlooked.

(2) In July and August of 2021, China successfully tested dual payload (nuclear or kinetic) hypersonic glide vehicles that are capable of fractional orbital bombardment and aerodynamic maneuvers after re-entry at speeds of over 3,900mph.

(3) Unlike the 2016 White Paper, which made note of “plans to build in-orbit servicing and maintenance systems for spacecraft” (otherwise known as Rendezvous and Proximity Operations [RPO]). The most recent publication refused to even mention the Shijian-21 satellite or RPO activities in general, despite its deployment in 2020 and successful mission in Dec. 2021 to move a defunct Beidou satellite into a graveyard orbit. Demonstrating a technological capability that could theoretically pose a threat to any other satellite in orbit.

These omissions coupled with a conscious effort to mirror the idealistic language used in international agreements, such as the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) and annual UN resolutions on the peaceful uses of outer space, belies the fact that the White Paper is in essence a PR document. It is designed to be a window into China’s model home of space activities, thereby advertising their scientific contributions to space exploration in order to attract international cooperation, all while overtly ignoring the more militaristic dimensions of the Chinese space program and their overall ambitions in orbit. This aversion to discussing security issues is so strong that it even prevents them from promoting their flagship treaty barring first placement of weapons in outer space, known as the PPWT, which China and Russia have been pushing in the UN Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) since 2008.

The PPWT is in and of itself a flawed document and it reflects the coy nature of China’s claim “to advocate sound and efficient governance of outer space”. Although it frames itself as limiting arms competition in the space environment, the PPWT only prohibits the placement of weapons systems in space but is silent on terrestrial counterspace capabilities such as ASAT’s and laser systems. Moreover, it delays verification mechanisms for future discussions. In all, the PPWT attempts to circumvent advantages that the U.S. possess as the dominant space power by preserving their capabilities to neutralize space based assets in America’s arsenal.

Despite claiming to work “under the framework of the United Nations, [in order to] actively participate in formulating international rules regarding outer space” no such progress is cited outside of regional bodies where China wields a dominant influence. China’s policy of “supporting the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) to play an important role [in rules formation] … and [working] within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” are clear deviations from the UN framework. Likewise, “strengthening international space cooperation that is based on common goals and serves the Belt and Road Initiative” has no bearing on broader concerns of governance at a global scale. It only reaffirms China’s intention to build a sphere of influence, through a coalition of the indebted, that is willing to acquiesce to the PRC’s vision of a fragmented international space order. A situation wherein China can pursue its ambition to become a dominant space power, to the extent that its geopolitical decisions will go unchallenged (in a meaningful way) due to China's increasingly sufficient deterrent capacity. This comes from the belief held by Chinese military planners that any U.S. capability to project force into the Western Pacific depends on its space assets, and that the ability to neutralize or deny these assets would deter America from future military intervention.

The PRC has been reluctant to formalize a national space law, having first promised to release a comprehensive space law in 2013, and pledging to release such a law every year since then. In this absence, the space industry is subject to a smattering of national policies that guide its role in the overall national strategy. The most relevant of these being the national policy of Military Civil Fusion (MCF). This policy essentially seeks to blend the R&D and manufacturing capabilities of the Chinese civil economy with the military organs of the state by making certain ostensibly independent entities subservient to the national security apparatus of the PLA. In 2015, President Xi Jinping made the “aligning of civil and defense technology development” a national priority, and in 2017, Beijing created the Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development as the principal entity for overseeing MCF.

The goal of this policy is to harness entrepreneurial innovation in order to mature domestic supply chains for military manufacturing and to achieve technological independence in critical sectors (such as space), while simultaneously diffusing the means of technological acquisition outside of traditional and perceptibly military entities. It is in this sense, as stated in the principles declaration of the White Paper, that the Chinese space program “is subject to and serves the overall national strategy”, wherein even academic institutions and some “private” companies are employed to provide cover for technology transfers and to circumvent export bans for the PLA. At the root of this problem is the “dual use conundrum”, which is shorthand to describe the many ways that technologies developed for non-military purposes can be retooled, or “spun-on” for new military innovation. For example, there is a direct correlation between the technology necessary to have a multi-satellite release mechanism and the development of a Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) nuclear warhead. It was best put by the former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Ford: “it is very difficult and in many cases impossible to engage with China’s high-technology sector in a way that does not entangle a foreign entity in supporting ongoing Chinese efforts to develop or otherwise acquire cutting-edge technological capacities for China’s armed forces.”

It is with everything we have discussed in mind that it becomes necessary to reevaluate the 2021 White Paper on Space Activities. The document seeks to highlight the noteworthy achievements of the Chinese national space program while framing its progress in a way that obscures the more devious elements of its role in the national security agenda. In the same way that the lack of a national space law provides ambiguity for covertly militaristic corporate and academic technological partnerships to occur, the White Paper acts as a facade which these entities can use to lure future collaboration. The exclusion of security related topics from the White Paper is therefore no accident, but rather a strategy designed to provide a false sense of amicability to the overall ambitions of the Chinese space program. Ambitions which ultimately come full circle to China’s national objective to achieve regional hegemony, export their technocratic security-state model, and sufficient deterrence to forestall any attempts to interfere with their ethnocentric domestic policies and coercive international partnerships.

On January 21, 2022 the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen bombed a detention center in the Houthi rebel heartland of Saada killing 70 people. The U.N Secretary-General Antonio Guterres condemned air strikes by a Saudi-led coalition and called for effective and transparent investigation.The bombing comes at a time of increased US scrutiny towards it’s weapon sales with Saudi Arabia as a result of the war. The U.S position on the Yemen war is complicated. Since 2015, the US has supported the coalition’s effort against the Houthis. However, Washington has dialed down the support following outrage over civilian death and other actions by the Saudi and UAE military. Throughout the past year, the White House has continued authorizing weapons sales to the Kingdom, despite opposition from some lawmakers, however the Biden administration halted the sale of offensive weapons to the Kingdom. In response to the recent escalation, the Biden administration apparently has doubled down on support to the coalition, announcing the sale of additional fighter aircraft to the UAE.

The armed conflict in Yemen began in 2011, when parts of the Yemenite population rose against President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who has ruled Yemen for 33 years. State security forces and pro-government assailants killed at least 225 protesters and bystanders during a largely peaceful demonstration. The protests forced Saleh to hand over power to his deputy Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, for a two-year period as part of the Gulf Cooperation Council , which called for Saleh’s immunity and for the opposition to join a coalition with his ruling party. As president, Mr. Hadi struggled to deal with a variety of problems, including attacks by jihadists, a separist movement in the south, as well corruption, unemployment and food insecurity. The Houthi movement known as Ansar Allah (Partisans of God) took advantage of the new president’s weakness, and the civil war intensified in 2015 when Houthi Shiite rebels with links to Iran and a history of rising up against the Sunni government- took control of Yemen.

The Saudi-led coalition intervened in Yemen’s civil war in March 2015, to halt the advance of the Houthis on behalf of the internationally recognized Yemeni government. The coalition has backed Yemeni ground forces with air strikes and a blockade, both of which have been criticized by human rights defenders. The parties to the conflict have violated international humanitarian law repeatedly, while the number of casualties continues to rise, and millions are facing famine. The UN World Food Program (WFP) warns of the impact of funding gaps, with fuel prices increasing over the past year and food prices doubling in that same period. The escalation of Conflict in Ukraine will likely further increase the prices and especially grains in the import-dependent country. The U.N Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that the war has so far caused the deaths of nearly a quarter-million people. In 2016, the Security Council adopted Resolution (2216) and imposed sanctions against some leaders of the Houthi group and forces loyal to the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Eleven countries voted in favor and four abstentions; the resolution describes the Houthis as a “terrorist group” and condemned the cross-border attacks launched by the Houthi group including those targeting Saudi Arabia.

The recent Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia shed light on the latest developments in the Yemeni war. The Houthis have opened another front by targeting the industrial zones airport construction sites near Al-Dhafra air base in Abu Dhabi. The development of Houthi drones and ballistic missiles , have underscored their capacity to hit targets in the Emirates, and since taking control of Sanaa Houthi forces launched unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), against the Saudi-led coalition.The Saudi-led coalition has retaliated by intensifying air raids on Houthi-held parts of northern Yemen with thousands of people being killed directly or indirectly. The major escalation by the Saudi-led coalition has led to deadly attacks on civilians and blockades.The UAE support for the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and the joint forces militias has benefitted the Houthis Interest, especially in the fight for Marib. The limited military effectiveness of the Saudi-led coalition is obvious when the spokesperson for the Saudi coalition used footage from a documentary about the invasion of Iraq war film as evidence to show Iran ballistic missiles being smuggled into Yemen at the city of Hodeidah. Later on the spokesperson apologized for using the fake Yemen video, saying it was a sourcing error. As a result the Hadi government has questioned the UAE’s approach to Yemen’s war, and its role in the conflict is a question of considerable significance for the Houthis strategic aims. As the war continues and questions are raised with more urgency about the military campaign of Saudi Arabia and its allies in Yemen, the Saudis will come to understand that the conflict will end one way or another, either through meeting their military objectives or being persuaded through diplomatic pressure to discard them.

On January 2nd, protestors took to the street in Zhanaozen, a city in the western region of Kazakhstan, to demonstrate against the government's removal of a cap on fuel prices the previous day, which led to a sharp rise in fuel costs. Over the next few days, the protests increased in size and violence and spread to other areas of Kazakhstan, including Kazakhstan's biggest city Almaty, with tens of thousands of frustrated Kazak citizens protesting the perceived incompetence and corruption of the Tokayev-led government. While the initial wave of protests were largely peaceful, violence escalated within a couple days with armed non-state groups attacking Kazakh police and soldiers and taking over government buildings. By the time the protests were declared by the government as having come to an end, more than two hundred Kazakh citizens had been killed, with thousands more injured and arrested.

Initially, the government attempted to stem the momentum of the protest movement through conciliatory measures, by firing most of the cabinet (they technically all resigned) and reversing its decision to remove its price cap on fuel. After the intensity of the protests showed little sign of abating over the next few days, the government shifted its tactics and began to increase its use of violent and punitive measures to halt the civil unrest. It warned that protesters would be shot on sight indiscriminately if they were found to be out in the streets, instituted a curfew, and cut all wireless connection to the outside world. It also called for military support from its close ally Russia and other members of the CTSO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), which sent in thousands of troops to strengthen the government's ability to control the situation. Unsurprisingly, Russia was keen to stabilize the country and avoid the possibility of its neighbor and ally becoming democratic. Russian troops withdrew on January 19th, after the protests had fizzled out.

To understand Kazakhstan politics, it is necessary to consider the enormous impact that former President Nursultan Nazarbayev has had on the Central Asian nation since it gained its independence in 1991. From 1991 to 2019, Nazarbayev was the president and was responsible for all business and political decisions and was even given the honorary title “leader of the nation” and some have described his political leadership as reflecting a cult of personality, similar to a few other authoritarian states such as North Korea. An interesting example of this dynamic can be seen when the Kazakhstan government decided to change the name of Kazakhstan’s capital from Astana to his first name, Nursultan, when he resigned in 2019. Although he had stepped down, his replacement President Tokayev promised to seek the advice of his predecessor and political mentor and give his opinions “special priority” and importance and a role of “importance in developing and making strategic decisions”.

Since then, times have changed the relationship between the former leaders. Aside from economic-related grievances, there have been rumors of a behind-the-scenes power struggle between Nazarbayev and Tokayev, another key factor that led to the recent protests and the shift from peaceful to violent demonstrations. Some saw President Tokayev's move to replace his cabinet as a dynamic that was reflective of this deeper power struggle. Included in the reshuffling of the cabinet was former President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who headed the influential security council which is an important position in the government, responsible for advising on and ensuring the implementation of national security and foreign policy. Nazarbayev was replaced by the current President Tokayev, a move that consolidated Tokayev's power and reduced that of Kazakhstan's former leader. Additionally, the head of Kazakhstan's intelligence agency (the KNB) Karim Masimov was arrested on January 6th and charged with treason. The arrest of such a senior government official and one that is seen as a close ally of Nazarbayev also hinted that Tokayev is attempting to demonstrate that he is no puppet of Nazarbayev and that he is the sole top authority within the Kazakh political elite. Furthermore, the fact that he spoke out and railed against the corruption and greed of Nazarbayev very publicly, is another important sign that President Tokayev has moved to distance himself from his former ally and consolidate his power.

To address rumors of the rift between himself and Tokayev and questions about his whereabouts, Nazarbayev released a video rejecting the allegations of his disappearance and the rift with President Tokayev saying“ There is no conflict or confrontation within the country’s elite. The rumors in this regard are completely groundless”. He disputed the disappearance rumors by explaining that he had been “enjoying life in retirement in the capital of Kazakhstan." Regardless of whether or not Mr. Nazarbayev was or was not enjoying life in retirement, the recent protests have symbolized an important change in Kazakh politics, that President Tokayev is now the undisputed authority in Kazakhstan and it appears President Nazarbayev won't be leaving his retirement (self-imposed or forced) any time soon.